A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES

José Luis Ferreira ()

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2011, vol. 13, issue 01, pages 93-104

Abstract: Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in three classic games, namely, the outside option game, the game of burning a dollar before the battle of the sexes and the beer-quiche game.

Keywords: Bagwell's paradox; noise; battle of the sexes; Beer-Quiche game; outside option; forward induction; JEL Numbers: C72; JEL Numbers: G13; JEL Numbers: L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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