Minority voting and public project provision

Hans Gersbach ()

Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 2009, vol. 3, issue 35, pages 1-40

Abstract: The author proposes a two-round process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first round, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first round is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second round, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second round, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. The author provides a first pass of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline the research program. --

Keywords: Democratic constitutions; minority voting; public projects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-35
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Related works:
Working Paper: Minority Voting and Public Project Provision (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifweej:200935

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