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Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Edited by R.J. Aumann and S. Hart from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Heidi Boesdal (). Access Statistics for this chapter series.
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- Ch 01 The game of chess , pp 1-17
- Herbert Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer
- Ch 02 Games in extensive and strategic forms , pp 19-40
- Sergiu Hart
- Ch 03 Games with perfect information , pp 41-70
- Jan Mycielski
- Ch 04 Repeated games with complete information , pp 71-107
- Sylvain Sorin
- Ch 05 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum , pp 109-154
- Shmuel Zamir
- Ch 06 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum , pp 155-177
- Francoise Forges
- Ch 07 Noncooperative models of bargaining , pp 179-225
- Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
- Ch 08 Strategic analysis of auctions , pp 227-279
- Robert Butler Wilson
- Ch 09 Location , pp 281-304
- Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques Thisse
- Ch 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence , pp 305-329
- Robert Butler Wilson
- Ch 11 Patent licensing , pp 331-354
- Morton . Kamien
- Ch 12 The core and balancedness , pp 355-395
- Yakar Kannai
- Ch 13 Axiomatizations of the core , pp 397-412
- Bezalel Peleg
- Ch 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies , pp 413-457
- Robert M. Anderson
- Ch 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies , pp 459-483
- Jean Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz
- Ch 16 Two-sided matching , pp 485-541
- Alvin Roth and Marilda Sotomayor
- Ch 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets , pp 543-590
- William F. Lucas
- Ch 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus , pp 591-667
- Michael Maschler
- Ch 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics , pp 669-707
- John C. Harsanyi
- Ch 20 Zero-sum two-person games , pp 735-768
- T.E.S. Raghavan
- Ch 21 Game theory and statistics , pp 769-779
- Gideon Schwarz
- Ch 22 Differential games , pp 781-799
- Avner Friedman
- Ch 23 Differential games -- Economic applications , pp 801-825
- Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan
- Ch 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility , pp 827-847
- Roger B. Myerson
- Ch 25 Signalling , pp 849-867
- David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel
- Ch 26 Moral hazard , pp 869-903
- Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner
- Ch 27 Search , pp 905-927
- John McMillan and Michael Rothschild
- Ch 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology , pp 929-993
- Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten
- Ch 29 Game theory models of peace and war , pp 995-1053
- O'Neill, Barry
- Ch 30 Voting procedures , pp 1055-1089
- Steven J. Brams
- Ch 31 Social choice , pp 1091-1125
- Herve Moulin
- Ch 32 Power and stability in politics , pp 1127-1151
- Philip Straffin
- Ch 33 Game theory and public economics , pp 1153-1192
- Mordecai Kurz
- Ch 34 Cost allocation , pp 1193-1235
- H. Peyton Young
- Ch 35 Cooperative models of bargaining , pp 1237-1284
- William Thomson
- Ch 36 Games in coalitional form , pp 1285-1303
- Robert James Weber
- Ch 37 Coalition structures , pp 1305-1337
- Joseph Greenberg
- Ch 38 Game-theoretic aspects of computing , pp 1339-1395
- Nathan Linial
- Ch 39 Utility and subjective probability , pp 1397-1435
- Peter C. Fishburn
- Ch 40 Common knowledge , pp 1437-1496
- John Geanakoplos
- Ch 41 Strategic equilibrium , pp 1521-1596
- Eric van Damme
- Ch 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium , pp 1597-1663
- John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg
- Ch 43 Incomplete information , pp 1665-1686
- Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz
- Ch 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games , pp 1687-1721
- T.E.S. Raghavan
- Ch 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games , pp 1723-1759
- Bernhard von Stengel
- Ch 46 Non-cooperative games with many players , pp 1761-1808
- M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun
- Ch 47 Stochastic games , pp 1809-1832
- Mertens, Jean-Francois
- Ch 48 Stochastic games: Recent results , pp 1833-1850
- Nicolas Vieille
- Ch 49 Game theory and industrial organization , pp 1851-1895
- Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky
- Ch 50 Bargaining with incomplete information , pp 1897-1945
- Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere
- Ch 51 Inspection games , pp 1947-1987
- Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard von Stengel and Shmuel Zamir
- Ch 52 Economic history and game theory , pp 1989-2024
- Avner Greif
- Ch 53 The shapley value , pp 2025-2054
- Eyal Winter
- Ch 54 Variations on the shapley value , pp 2055-2076
- Dov Monderer and Dov Samet
- Ch 55 Values of non-transferable utility games , pp 2077-2120
- Richard P. McLean
- Ch 56 Values of games with infinitely many players , pp 2121-2167
- Abraham Neyman
- Ch 57 Values of perfectly competitive economies , pp 2169-2184
- Sergiu Hart
- Ch 58 Some other economic applications of the value , pp 2185-2201
- Mertens, Jean-Francois
- Ch 59 Strategic aspects of political systems , pp 2203-2228
- Jeffrey S. Banks
- Ch 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions , pp 2229-2269
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre and Lewis A. Kornhauser
- Ch 61 Implementation theory , pp 2271-2326
- Thomas R. Palfrey
- Ch 62 Game theory and experimental gaming , pp 2327-2351
- Martin Shubik
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