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Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Edited by R.J. Aumann and S. Hart
from Elsevier
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Ch 01 The game of chess , pp 1-17
Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer Ch 02 Games in extensive and strategic forms , pp 19-40
Sergiu Hart Ch 03 Games with perfect information , pp 41-70
Jan Mycielski Ch 04 Repeated games with complete information , pp 71-107
Sylvain Sorin Ch 05 Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum , pp 109-154
Shmuel Zamir Ch 06 Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum , pp 155-177
Francoise Forges Ch 07 Noncooperative models of bargaining , pp 179-225
Ken Binmore , Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein Ch 08 Strategic analysis of auctions , pp 227-279
Robert Butler Wilson Ch 09 Location , pp 281-304
Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques François Thisse Ch 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence , pp 305-329
Robert Butler Wilson Ch 11 Patent licensing , pp 331-354
Morton . Kamien Ch 12 The core and balancedness , pp 355-395
Yakar Kannai Ch 13 Axiomatizations of the core , pp 397-412
Bezalel Peleg Ch 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies , pp 413-457
Robert M. Anderson Ch 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies , pp 459-483
Jean Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz Ch 16 Two-sided matching , pp 485-541
Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Antonia de Oliveira Sotomayor Ch 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets , pp 543-590
William F. Lucas Ch 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus , pp 591-667
Michael Maschler Ch 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics , pp 669-707
John C. Harsanyi Ch 20 Zero-sum two-person games , pp 735-768
T.E.S. Raghavan Ch 21 Game theory and statistics , pp 769-779
Gideon Schwarz Ch 22 Differential games , pp 781-799
Avner Friedman Ch 23 Differential games -- Economic applications , pp 801-825
Simone Clemhout and Henry Wan Ch 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility , pp 827-847
Roger B. Myerson Ch 25 Signalling , pp 849-867
David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel Ch 26 Moral hazard , pp 869-903
Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner Ch 27 Search , pp 905-927
John McMillan and Michael Rothschild Ch 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology , pp 929-993
Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten Ch 29 Game theory models of peace and war , pp 995-1053
O'Neill, Barry Ch 30 Voting procedures , pp 1055-1089
Steven J. Brams Ch 31 Social choice , pp 1091-1125
Herve Moulin Ch 32 Power and stability in politics , pp 1127-1151
Philip Straffin Ch 33 Game theory and public economics , pp 1153-1192
Mordecai Kurz Ch 34 Cost allocation , pp 1193-1235
H. Peyton Young Ch 35 Cooperative models of bargaining , pp 1237-1284
William Thomson Ch 36 Games in coalitional form , pp 1285-1303
Robert James Weber Ch 37 Coalition structures , pp 1305-1337
Joseph Greenberg Ch 38 Game-theoretic aspects of computing , pp 1339-1395
Nathan Linial Ch 39 Utility and subjective probability , pp 1397-1435
Peter C. Fishburn Ch 40 Common knowledge , pp 1437-1496
John Geanakoplos Ch 41 Strategic equilibrium , pp 1521-1596
Eric van Damme Ch 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium , pp 1597-1663
John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg Ch 43 Incomplete information , pp 1665-1686
Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz Ch 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games , pp 1687-1721
T.E.S. Raghavan Ch 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games , pp 1723-1759
Bernhard von Stengel Ch 46 Non-cooperative games with many players , pp 1761-1808
M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun Ch 47 Stochastic games , pp 1809-1832
Jean-François Mertens Ch 48 Stochastic games: Recent results , pp 1833-1850
Nicolas Vieille Ch 49 Game theory and industrial organization , pp 1851-1895
Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky Ch 50 Bargaining with incomplete information , pp 1897-1945
Lawrence M. Ausubel , Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere Ch 51 Inspection games , pp 1947-1987
Rudolf Avenhaus , Bernhard von Stengel and Shmuel Zamir Ch 52 Economic history and game theory , pp 1989-2024
Avner Greif Ch 53 The shapley value , pp 2025-2054
Eyal Winter Ch 54 Variations on the shapley value , pp 2055-2076
Dov Monderer and Dov Samet Ch 55 Values of non-transferable utility games , pp 2077-2120
Richard P. McLean Ch 56 Values of games with infinitely many players , pp 2121-2167
Abraham Neyman Ch 57 Values of perfectly competitive economies , pp 2169-2184
Sergiu Hart Ch 58 Some other economic applications of the value , pp 2185-2201
Jean-François Mertens Ch 59 Strategic aspects of political systems , pp 2203-2228
Jeffrey Scot Banks Ch 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions , pp 2229-2269
Jean-Pierre Benoit and Lewis A. Kornhauser Ch 61 Implementation theory , pp 2271-2326
Thomas R. Palfrey Ch 62 Game theory and experimental gaming , pp 2327-2351
Martin Shubik
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