Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare
Edited by K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen and K. Suzumura
from Elsevier
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- Ch 01 Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework , pp 35-94
- Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
- Ch 02 Categories of arrovian voting schemes , pp 95-129
- Fuad Aleskerov
- Ch 03 Domain restrictions , pp 131-170
- Wulf Christian Gaertner
- Ch 04 Voting procedures , pp 173-236
- Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn
- Ch 05 Implementation theory , pp 237-288
- Eric S. Maskin and Tomas Sjostrom
- Ch 06 Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing , pp 289-357
- Herve Moulin
- Ch 07 Positional rules of collective decision-making , pp 361-394
- Prasanta K. Pattanaik
- Ch 08 Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees , pp 395-423
- Bezalel Peleg
- Ch 09 Representative democracy as social choice , pp 425-455
- Norman Schofield
- Ch 10 Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability , pp 459-541
- d'Aspremont, Claude and Louis Gevers
- Ch 11 Utilitarianism and the theory of justice , pp 543-596
- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
- Ch 12 Chapter 12 Inequality, poverty and welfare , pp 597-633
- Bhaskar Dutta
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