DEBT STABILISATION BIAS AND THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: OPTIMAL POLICY IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH GOVERNMENT DEBT AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE

Sven Jari Stehn () and David Vines

CAMA Working Papers from Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis

Abstract: Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that government debt is returned to its pre-shock level in a New Keynesian model under optimal discretionary policy. This has two important implications for monetary and fiscal policy. First, in a high-debt economy, it may be optimal for discretionary monetary policy to cut the interest rate in response to a cost-push shock - thereby violating the Taylor principle - although this will not be true if inflation is significantly persistent. Second, the optimal fiscal response to such a shock is more active under discretion than commitment, whatever the degree of inflation persistence.

JEL-codes: E52 E60 E61 E63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
Date: 2007-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Debt Stabilization Bias and the Taylor Principle: Optimal Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Government Debt and Inflation Persistence (2007)
Working Paper: Debt Stabilisation Bias and the Taylor Principle: Optimal Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Government Debt and Inflation Persistence (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:camaaa:2007-22

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