Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions

Eric S. Maskin and John Graham Riley

No 31, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Keywords: Sealed High-Bid Auctions; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 R10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/econpaper31.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ads:wpaper:0031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Nancy Cotterman ().