A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda

Alessandra Casella () and Andrew Gelman ()
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Andrew Gelman: Department of Statistics, Columbia University

No 60, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Abstract: This paper proposes a simple scheme designed to elicit and reward intensity of preferences in referenda: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus an additional number of bonus votes to cast as desired. Decisions are taken according to the majority of votes cast. In our base case, where there is no systematic difference between proposals’ supporters and opponents, there is always a positive number of bonus votes such that ex ante utility is increased by the scheme, relative to simple majority voting. When the distributions of valuations of supporters and opponents differ, the improvement in efficiency is guaranteed if the distributions can be ranked according to first order stochastic dominance. If they are, however, the existence of welfare gains is independent of the exact number of bonus votes.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
Date: 2005-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005)
Working Paper: A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005)
Working Paper: A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda (2005)
Journal Article: A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda (2008)
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