CROP INSURANCE CONTRACTING: MORAL HAZARD COSTS THROUGH SIMULATION

Robert D. Weaver () and Taeho Kim

No 20729, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Moral hazard costs are estimated using a new crop insurance design approach. The simulation results show that incorporation of incentive compatibility constraints into insurance design can substantially reduce moral hazard costs.

Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001

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