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CROP INSURANCE CONTRACTING: MORAL HAZARD COSTS THROUGH SIMULATION
Robert D. Weaver Taeho Kim
2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Moral hazard costs are estimated using a new crop insurance design approach. The simulation results show that incorporation of incentive compatibility constraints into insurance design can substantially reduce moral hazard costs.
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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