BUNDLING AND LICENSING OF GENES IN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

Guanming Shi

No 19913, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper examines the strategic incentive for gene holders to vertically integrate with seed companies, and with herbicide/insecticide oligopolies, given the unique institutional structure and relevant market in agricultural biotechnology. We model the case with homogeneous basic seeds, and investigate both pre-entry and post-entry equilibrium.

Keywords: Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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