Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages

Maoyong Fan, Myoungki Lee and Steven Wu

No 20392, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Using a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare.

Keywords: Crop Production/Industries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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