STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF POOLED BROILER CONTRACTS: RELATIVE-PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS VS. FIXED-PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS

Yanguo Wang and Edward C. Jaenicke

No 20406, 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: With the broiler industry as a backdrop, this paper develops theoretical models to compare optimal incentives of pooled relative-performance and fixed-performance contracts in static and dynamic models that account for both adverse selection and moral hazard. In spite of some growers’' complaints about the relative-performance contracts used in the broiler industry, model results largely justify the popularity and superiority of relative performance contracts relative to fixed performance contracts

Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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