ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE MARKET FOR CROP INSURANCE

Agapi Somwaru, Shiva S. Makki and Keith H. Coble ()

No 21002, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: This paper examines the potential for adverse selection when farmers are offered a portfolio of insurance policies. We analyze the risk characteristics farmers who bought alternative insurance instruments in 1996-97. Inability to differentiate farmers according to risk types results in pooling equilibrium which may implicitly subsidize high risk farmers.

Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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