OPPOSITION TO CONTRACT PRODUCTION: SELF-SELECTION, STATUS, AND STRANDED ASSETS

David Skully

No 21012, 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: Production contract tournaments induce self-selection among producers. Self-selection for pork differs from broiler production resulting in a predictably different political response by incumbent producers to contract innovation. The higher capital and status of incumbent pork producers than poultry producers account for much of the difference.

Keywords: Industrial Organization; Labor and Human Capital; Livestock Production/Industries; J41 Contracts; Specific Human Capital; J43 Agricultural Labor Markets; L22 Firm Organization; Markets vs. Hierarchies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://purl.umn.edu/21012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea98:21012

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by AgEcon Search ().