Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement

Peter Bardsley and Ingrid Burfurd

No 48047, 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia from Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society

Abstract: Market based instruments are proving increasingly effective in biodiversity procurement and in regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these policy instruments brings together issues in auction design, contract theory, biology, and monitoring technology. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard model, we show that optimal contract design may differ significantly between procurement and regulatory policy environments.

Keywords: biodiversity; procurement; adverse selection; moral hazard; contract theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-env and nep-reg
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement (2008)
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