Determinants of Farm Policies in the United States, 1996-2008

David Orden, David Blandford and Timothy Josling

No 50297, Agricultural Distortions Working Paper from World Bank

Abstract: This paper focuses on the political economy of U.S. farm policy since the Uruguay Round trade negotiations concluded in 1994 and established the WTO. The continued ability of the powerful farm lobby in the United States to elicit support in the political arena is evident from this analysis. Yet there have been some substantial changes in policy that have reduced their distortionary effects, as well as some setbacks to liberalizing reform. New Doha Round commitments could put further constraints on subsidies provided by some U.S. policy instruments. And despite the ability of the farm lobby to retain its support programs through 2012, there are several political uncertainties about the alignments that have allowed U.S. farm support to endure.

Keywords: Distorted incentives; agricultural and trade policy reforms; national agricultural development; United States farm policies; political economy of agricultural distortions; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; O13; P22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-pol
Date: 2009-05
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