Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement?

Robert M. Feinberg () and Thomas A Husted ()

No 2011-07, Working Papers from American University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Recent research has documented a substantial role in antitrust enforcement by U.S. states. While many of the cases litigated involve small local firms, a non-trivial portion encompass multiplestate issues. Some previous literature has investigated whether states engage in free-riding behavior in environmental regulation, and whether governments free ride on private decisions in provision of public goods. In this paper, we analyze a sample of antitrust cases involving crossstate impacts (from the Multi-State Antitrust Database, provided by the National Association of Attorneys General) and explain the determinants of free-riding (which we define as participatingin a case, but not as a lead plaintiff). JEL classification:

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hme, nep-ind and nep-reg
Date: 2011-10
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Journal Article: DO STATES FREE RIDE IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT? (2013)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:amu:wpaper:2011-07

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