Abstract:
This work studies the appearance of non exclusive fuel resaling firms, unbranded resale firms, which don't carry any connections to fuel distributors. In this sense, a simple strategic model was consolidated, in which the only asymmetric information relates to the contracts settled among unbranded resale firms and disbributors and branded resale firms and distributors. The model evaluates the strategic relations between the upstream and downstream sectors, considering a partial vertical relation, such that de branded resale firms bounded by contracts with the distributor, are integrated by an exclusive contract with the distributor. On the other hand, the unbranded resale firm continues with no vertical integration. Consequently, it is observed that the existence of unbranded resale firms in the market allows an optimal and lower price with larger supply in equilibrium.
JEL-codes:L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2004