Club objectives and ticket pricing in professional team sports

Stefan Kesenne ()

Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics

Abstract: In this paper the simultaneous decision of a professional sports club on gate ticket prices and talent demand is analysed for a profit and a win maximizing sports club. Although the pricing rule is the same in both scenario’s, the ticket price and the talent demand turn out to be higher in a win maximizing club. Somewhat unexpected is the result that an increase of salary level lowers the optimal ticket price, which complicates the impact of a salary cap on the ticket price. One of the consequences of the identical pricing rule is that all tests based on the pricing rule cannot be conclusive w.r.t. the objective of a club. Also the value of the estimated price elasticity of the demand for tickets can hardly reveal anything about the objective of a sports club. More reliable tests could be based on the comparison of the marginal productivity and the salary level, or on the different impact of revenue sharing.

Date: 2002-08

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=*TEWHI&n=14358&ct=009824&e=21250
http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=*TEWHI&n=14358&ct=009824&e=21251
http://www.ua.ac.be/download.aspx?c=*TEWHI&n=14358&ct=009824&e=21252 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Club Objectives and Ticket Pricing in Professional Team Sports (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2002018

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Joeri Nys ().