Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration

Manjira Datta and Tito Cordella ()

Working Papers from Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University

Abstract: In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).

JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic

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Related works:
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration (1995)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration (1994)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration (1994)
Journal Article: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration (2002)
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