Lattice Methods in Computation of Sequential Markov Equilibrium in Dynamic Games

Manjira Datta, Leonard Jay Mirman, Olivier Morand and Kevin Reffett ()
Additional contact information
Olivier Morand: University of Connecticut, http://wpcarey.asu.edu/Directory/stafffaculty.cfm?cobid=1049335
Kevin Reffett: W. P. Carey School of Business Department of Economics, http://wpcarey.asu.edu/Directory/stafffaculty.cfm?cobid=1039534

Working Papers from Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University

Abstract:

This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarski's fixed point theorem due to Veinott (1992) and Zhou (1994) to establish sufficient conditions for existence of sequential symmetric Markov equilibrium in a large class of dynamic games. Our method is constructive and we provide specific algorithms for computing equilibrium. These results are applied to the classic fishwar game in the context of a finite horizon. JEL Classification: C62, C63, C73, D90

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://wpcarey.asu.edu/tools/mytools/pubs_admin/FILES/FishwarDec2004.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Steve Salik ().