Abstract:
This paper presents a model of auctions with resale which is then applied to sales of timber harvesting contracts held by the U.S. Forest Service. After a contract is sold, there is often a considerable delay before harvesting must begin, and each firm's uncertainty regarding the value it places on the contract may be resolved in the interim. Because contracts can be transferred in some circumstances and can always be subcontracted, bidding may reflect the presence of a resale market in which the ex post gains to trade can be exploited. An analysis of the data yields results which support the predictions of the model.
Keywords:AUCTIONS; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:L42L43L29 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 1997
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More papers in Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Address: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A. Series data maintained by Ailsenne Sumwalt ().
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