Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition

Roberto Burguet and Xavier Vives ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper studies the incentives of short-lived agents to acquire costly private information in the presence of public signals arising from market interaction. It characterizes the social learning process, that is the revelation of information by public signals, and the information externalities involved. The analysis provides insights on the scope for government intervention.

Keywords: INFORMATION; COSTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:323.96

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