Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers

Salvador Barberà (), A Bogomolnaia and H van der Stel

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each progile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisfying strategy- proofness.

Keywords: ECONOMIC THEORY; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Journal Article: Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:330.96

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