Overconfident Spiculation with Imperfect Competition

Jordi Caballe () and Jozsef Sakovics ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study the effects of varying the confidence level of speculators and the confidence level attributed to them by their competitors, about the precision of their private information in the framework of the model of financial markets with imperfect competition a la Kyle (1989).

Keywords: SPECULATION; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:336.96

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Xavier Vila ().