Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm

G. Biglaiser and Ching-to Albert Ma ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regular cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; REGULATION; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 K20 E22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1996)
Working Paper: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1996)
Journal Article: Investment Incentives of a Regulated Dominant Firm (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:340.96

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Xavier Vila ().