Convergence of Aspirations and (Partial) Cooperation in the Prisoners's Dilemma

Frederic Palomino and F. Vega

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper proposes an aspiration-based model of bounded rationality, which is applied to a large-population context where agents are re-matched every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:345.96

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Xavier Vila ().