Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation

Winand Emons ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: Plaintiffs have either stong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needds additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney's recommendation. We show that under contingent fees there will generally be excessive litigation. In contrast, an hourly fee implements the efficient amount of litigation.

Keywords: INCENTIVES; LITIGATION; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Working Paper: Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation (1996)
Working Paper: Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation (1996)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:356.96

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