Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

Salvador Barberà (), Jordi Masso and Shigehiro Serizawa ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences.

Keywords: DECISION MAKING; VOTING; ELECTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (1996)
Journal Article: Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges (1998)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:358.96

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