Epsilon Cores of Games and Economies With Limited Side Payments

Alexander Kovalenkov () and Myrna Wooders ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a large game with limited side payments has a non-empty epsilon-core. Our second result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly effective small groups is assumed, then all payoffs in the epsilon-core treat all players of the same type approximately eqully. A bound on the distance between epsilon-core payoffs of any two players of the same approximate type is given in terms of the parameters describing the game.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Related works:
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1997)
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (2000)
Working Paper: Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:392.97

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