A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition

F. Rocher and Xavier Vilà ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: The model we discuss in this note is a re-examination of the classical Bertrand model of imperfect competition. the main difference is that consumers are allowed to have some strategic behavior when deciding from which one of the two sellers to buy. We will approach the resolution of the situation sketched above using two related but different tools. The two of them consider a probabilisstic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior can affect the competition between the sellers.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Working Paper: A NOTE ON AGENT-BASED IMPERFECT COMPETITION (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:398.97

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