Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly

Miguel González-Maestre ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In this paper, we consider an oligopolistic market where every firm decides, simultaneously, its number of independant divisions and, subsequently, every division decides, simultaneously, the incentive scheme for its manager. In the last stage, we assume Cournot competition among all the managers.

Keywords: MARKET; STRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Journal Article: Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:403.97

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