Manipulability, Unanimity, Anonymity and Assesment Aggregation

A.Q. Arana

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: An assesment aggregation rule is a mechanism which collapses several individual assessments ("quantitative opinions") into a unique ("collective") assessment. Individual i can manipulate assessment aggregation if the change in the aggregated assessmentdue to a change in i's assesment from x to y. Some asumptions on the functionl form capturing this dependance are put forward and their effects on aggregationinvestgated under unanimity and anonymity conditions. Threee results are sought after: (1)the aggregation rule does not exist; (2) it is the arith,etical mean; (3) it is dictatorial.

Keywords: DECISION; MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:405.97

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