Comparing Organizational Structures in Health Services

Izabela Jelovac () and Ines Macho-Stadler ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: The study of organizational choice is crucial to the understanding of firms' efficiency. We consider this issue applied to contracts on health services. In particular, we analyze the circumstances under which it is better for an insurer to contract with both the hospital and the physician instead of contracting exclusively with the hospital, delegating to the latter the power to contract the physician.

Keywords: MORAL HAZARD; HEALTH SERVICES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I11 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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Journal Article: Comparing organizational structures in health services (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:412.98

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