A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure

David Perez-Castrillo () and M. Sotomayor

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: For the assignment game, we anlayze the following mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first, then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any, among the remaining objects. The first phase of the game determines the potential proces, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the mechanism coincides with the set of sellers' optimal stable outcomes when buyers use maximal strategies.

Keywords: MODELS; GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure (2002)
Working Paper: A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:421.98

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