Voting by Committees under Constraints

Salvador BARBER?, Jordi Masso and Alejandro NEME

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Keywords: Voting; Strategy-proofness; Additive and Separable Preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-net
Date: 2001-10-23
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Related works:
Working Paper: Voting by Committees Under Constraints (2000)
Journal Article: Voting by committees under constraints (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:501.01

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