The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Kaniska Dam and David Perez-Castrillo ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Keywords: Principal-agent; Moral hazard; Matching; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2001-11-27
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Principal-Agent Matching Market (2003)
Journal Article: The Principal-Agent Matching Market (2006)
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