Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes

Ines Macho-Stadler () and David Perez-Castrillo ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Keywords: Environmental taxes; optimal audit policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 K42 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2004-04-27
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/61204.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes (2004)
Journal Article: Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:612.04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Xavier Vila ().