An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version)

David Perez-Castrillo () and David Wettstein ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Keywords: Non-Transferable utility games; Shapley value; Ordinal Shapley value; consistency; fairness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D50 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2004-12-14
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:634.04

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