Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities

Ines Macho-Stadler (), David Perez-Castrillo () and David Wettstein ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Keywords: Shapley value; dividends; games with externalities; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
Date: 2008-12-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:758.08

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