UFAE and IAE Working Papers

from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
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152.91: The Dedline Effect: A Theoretical Note

C.P. Obiols

151.91: Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining Over Many Issues

C.P. Obiols

150.91: Compromise VS Capitulation in a Simple Model of Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

C.P. Obiols

149.90: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Plant Pollination: Pollinator-Scarce VS. Pollinator-Abundant Contexts

Fernando Vega-Redondo and A. Dafni

148.90: A Game-Theoretic Model of Predator-Prey Signalling

Fernando Vega-Redondo and O. Hasson

147.90: Strategic Market Processes in an Evolutionary Context

Fernando Vega-Redondo

146.90: Technological Change and Institutional Inertia; A Co-Evolutionary Model with Two Hierarchical Levels

Fernando Vega-Redondo

145.90: Technological Change and Path Dependence: A Co-Evolutionary Model on a Directed Graph

Fernando Vega-Redondo

144.90: The Functioning of Cooperatives Under Renegotioation

Debraj Ray

143.90: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation

A. Neme and L. Quintas

142.90: Bundling Subscription TV Channels

S. Chae

141.90: Insights or Forecasting? An Evaluation of a Simple CGE Model of Spain

C. Polo and Ferran Sancho

140.90: An Analysis of Spain's Integration in the EEC

C. Polo and Ferran Sancho

139.90: Dominance and Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence

J. Brandt and Charles A. Holt

138.90: A general Equilibrium Approach to trade and Industrial Policy: The Case of Spain

C. Polo, David Roland-Holst and Ferran Sancho

137.90: Market Versus Limit Orders

Jordi Caballe

136-90: BASING POINT PRICING: COMPETITION VERSUS COLLUSION

Jacques Thisse and Xavier Vives

135-90: HOW FAST DO RATIONAL AGENTS LEARN?

Xavier Vives

134-90: MEMORY STARTEGIES IN NONATOMIC REPEATED GAMES

Jordi Masso

133-90: INFORMATION CONTROL IN SIMULTANEOUS MOVES GAMES

Pau Olivella

132.90: Insider Trading and asset Pricing in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi- Secrity Market

Jordi Caballe and M. Krishnan

130.90: Evidence of risk Premia in Foreign Currency Futures Markets

Tom McCurdy and .G. Morgan

129.90: Implementation in economies with a Continuum of Agents

Xavier Vives and Mas-Colell, A.

128-89: ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC VALUATION

Martinez-Alier, J.

127-89: DIFFERENTIABILITY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN DISCRETE-TIME INFINITE-HORIZON OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS

Manuel Santos

126-89: OPTIMAL LEASING WITH LEARNING AND COMMITMENT

R.B. Verde

125-89: COLLUSION BY ASYMMETRICALY INFORMED FIRMS

R. Kihlstrom and Xavier Vives

124-89: RENEGOTIATION-PROOF EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS TIME GAMES

James Bergin and W. Bentley Macleod

123-89: FAIR DIVISION UNDER JOINT OWNERSHIP: RECENT RESULTS AND OPEN PROBLEMS

Herve Moulin

122-89: AUTOREGRESSIVE MODELS WITH SUDDEN VARIANCE CHANGES AT UNKNOWN POINTS

C. Inclan

121-89: EFICIENCY AND RENEGOTIATION IN REPEATED GAMES

James Bergin and W. Bentley Macleod

120-89: WELFARE BOUNDS AND FAIR ALLOCATION OF PRIVATE GOODS

Herve Moulin

119-89: SMOOTHNESS OF POLICY FUNCTION IN DISCRETE TIME ECONOMIC MODELS

Manuel Santos

118-89: FORWARD INDUCTION: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM TWO-STAGE GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION

J. Brandts and Charles A. Holt

117-89: UNIFORM EXTERNALITIES: TWO AXIOMS FOR FAIR ALLOCATION

Herve Moulin

116-89: OPTIMAL LABOR CONTRACTS WITH NON-CONTRACTIBLE HUMAN CAPITAL

Y. Kanemoto and W. Bentley Macleod

115-89: THE CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLICITY PROVIDED INPUTS TO THE STATE'S ECONOMIES

Garcia-Mila, T. and T.J. McGuire

114.89: WAGE PREMIUMS AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION IN EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS

W. Bentley Macleod and James Malcomson

113-89: LABOUR TURNOVER AND THE NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT: EFFICIENCY WAGE V.S FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT

W. Bentley Macleod and James Malcomson

112-89: SMOOTHNESS OF POLICY FUNCTION IN CONTINUOUS TIME ECONOMIC MODELS: THE ONE DIMENSIONAL CASE

Manuel Santos and Vila, J-L.

111-89: ENTRY, SUNK COSTS AND RENEGOTIATION IN DUOPOLY

W. Bentley Macleod and James Bergin

110-89: SPACIAL COMPETITION AND THE CORE

Jonathan H. Hamilton, W. Bentley Macleod and Jacques Thisse

109-89: DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS THAT SOLVE CONTINUOUS-TIME CONCAVE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS ANYTHING GOES

Luigi Montrucchio

108-89: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Fernando Vega-Redondo

107-88: NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES

Xavier Vives

106-88: WELFARE BOUNDS IN THE FAIR DIVISION PROBLEM

Herve Moulin

105.88: COLLUSION BY ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED DUOPOLISTS

Xavier Vives and R.E. Kihlstrom

104-88: ON BRAND PROLIFERATION WITH VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION

X.M. Giralt

103-88: CONFIGURATIONS OF FANS AND NESTS OF LIMIT CYCLES FOR POLYNOMIAL VECTOR FIELDS IN THE PLANE

J. Llibre and A. Cima

102-88: BOUNDED POLYNOMIAL VECTRO FIELDS

A. Cima and J. Llibre