"Efficient Bargains" as a Wage-Compliance Device in Industries with Market Power
Minas Vlassis ()
DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
This paper investigates if, and how, aternative bargaining agentas may sustain (or, emerge) endogenously, under conditions of centralized wage bargaining, in industries with market power. The wage & employment bargains agenta ("Efficient Bargains") is shown to be a strategic device to induce (weak) wage-compliance, used by large, technologically efficient firms; whenever there are incentives for wage-undercutting, on the part of small, labour-intensive firms.
Keywords: WAGES; OLIGOPOLIES; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 J31 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: "Efficient Bargains" as a Wage-Compliance Device in Industries with Market Power (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:107
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