The Political Economy of the "National Minimum Wage Institution"
Emmanuel Petrakis () and
Minas Vlassis ()
DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
Whilst their products are substituable for the consumer, there exist technological asymmetries across the unionized sectors of an economy. There are high-tech as well as low-tech sectors. We show, that, due to those asymmetries in productivity, inter-sectoral minimum wage agreements may endogenously emerge, always being the medianvoter's most preferred outcome.
Keywords: MINIMUM WAGE; WORKERS' REPRESENTATION; ECONOMIC POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 J31 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The Political Economy of the "National Minimum Wage Institution" (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:113
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