Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework
Eftichios Sartzetakis (),
Anastasios Xepapadeas () and
No 1502, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
Taking as given that we are consuming too much and that overconsumption leads to environmental degradation, the present paper examines the regulator's choices between informative advertisement and consumptiontaxation. We model overconsumption by considering individuals that care about social status apart from the intrinsic utility, derived from direct consumption. We assume that there also exist individuals that care only about their own private consumption and we examine the evolution of preferences through time by allowing individuals to alter their behavior as a result of a learning process, akin to a replicator dynamics type.We consider the regulator's choice of consumption taxation and informative advertisement both in an arbitrary and an optimal control context. In the arbitrary overconsumption control context we find that the regulator could decrease, or even eliminate, the share of status seekers in the population. In the context of optimal overconsumption control, we show that the highest welfare is attained when status seekers are completely eliminated, while the lowest in the case that the entire population consists of status seekers.
Keywords: status-seaking; replicator dynamics; information provision; environmental taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q53 Q58 D62 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-evo and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://wpa.deos.aueb.gr/docs/Regulating.the.Environmental.Consequences.pdf First version (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aue:wpaper:1502
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ekaterini Glynou ().