Resource Harvesting Regulation and Enforcement: An Evolutionary Approach
Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos () and
Anastasios Xepapadeas ()
No 1518, DEOS Working Papers from Athens University of Economics and Business
We study the evolution of compliance and regulation in a common pool resource setup with myopic appropriators whose decision on whether to comply or not with the harvesting rule is a result of imitation as described by a proportional rule. The regulator first sets the optimal quota and then harvesters can choose between compliance and violation. We investigate myopic regulation and optimal regulation regimes with both proportional and non-proportional fine formulation and and an endogenized probability of audition. The equilibria are then characterized in terms of their stability properties.
Keywords: Common pool resources; replicator dynamics; optimal regulation; compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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