Guessing Games and People Behaviours: What Can we Learn?

Andrea Morone () and Piergiuseppe Morone ()

No 15, series from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche - Università di Bari

Abstract: In this paper we address the topic of guessing games. By developing a generalised theory of naïveté, we show how Güth et al..s result (i.e. convergence toward interior equilibria is faster than convergence toward boundary equilibria) is compatible with Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour. However, we also show how, under new model parameterisation, neither Güth et al..s story of convergence towards interior equilibria, nor Nagel.s theory of boundedly rational behaviour are verified. We conclude that the results of Nagel (1995) and Güth et al. (2002), however interesting, are severely affected by the ad hoc parameterisation chosen for the game.

Keywords: Guessing game; p-beauty contest; individual behaviour. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
Date: 2007-02, Revised 2007-02
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