The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

Francesc Llerena and Carlos Rafels Pallarola
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Carlos Rafels Pallarola: Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 144, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), ()-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing ()-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and superadditive games.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005
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