Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and convex descompositions of TU games

Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels
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Carles Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

No 245, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: We study under which conditions the core of a game involved in a convex decomposition of another game turns out to be a stable set of the decomposed game. Some applications and numerical examples, including the remarkable Lucas five player game with a unique stable set different from the core, are reckoning and analyzed.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2010
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