Existência de equilíbrio num jogo com bancarrota e agentes heterogêneos
Rodrigo Andrés Peñaloza () and
Benjamin Tabak ()
No 326, Working Papers Series from Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department
This paper shows the existence of Nash equilibrium for an economy with a continuum of heterogeneous agents, discrete time, infinite horizon, fiat money and one nondurable commodity. The commodity production remains constant for each period. However, the commodity endowments of individual agents are random, and fluctuate from period to period. At the beginning of each period, agents must decide how much of their current monetary wealth to spend on consumption of the commodity. The agents are able to lend or borrow money. Those agents that are not able to pay back their debts go to bankrupt. In this case, they receive a nonmonetary punishment in units of utility.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bcb:wpaper:326
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