Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care
Pedro Barros () and
Xavier Martinez-Giralt ()
No 170, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
A feature present in countries with a National Health Service is the coexistence of a public and a private sector. Often, the public payer contracts with private providers while holding idle capacity. This is often seen as inefficiency from the management of public facilities. We present here a different rationale for the existence of such idle capacity: the public sector may opt to have idle capacity as a way to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the private provider, under the assumption of a more efficient private than the public sector.
Keywords: negotiation; health care (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Bargaining and idle public sector capacity in health care (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:170
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