Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games

Sonja Brangewitz () and Jan-Philip Gamp ()
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Sonja Brangewitz: Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Jan-Philip Gamp: Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 454, Working Papers from Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets linked to that game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Shapley and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they omit the details of the proof which we present here. This more general case is in particular interesting, as the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases.

Keywords: Market Games; Competitive Payoffs; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10
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